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This paper investigates the role of institutional infrastructures in the financial inclusion-growth 
nexus for a panel of twenty countries in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA).Employing the System 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), the following insightful outcomes are established. 
First, while there is an unrestricted positive impact of physical access to ATMs and ICT 
measures of financial inclusion on SSA’s growth but only the former was found significant. 
Second, the four institutional components via economic, political, institutional and general 
governances were also found to be growth-spurring. Lastly, countries with low levels of real per 
capita income are matching up with other countries with high levels of real income per capita. 
The empirical evidence of some negative net effects and insignificant marginal impacts are 
indication that imperfections in the financial markets are sometimes employed to the 
disadvantage of the poor. On the whole, we established positive effects on growth for the most 
part. The positive effects are evident because the governance indicators compliment financial 
inclusion in reducing pecuniary constraints hindering credit access and allocation to the poor that 
deteriorate growth. 
 
Keywords: Financial Inclusion; Economic Growth; Governance; System Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) 





The importance of finance as a driver of growth and other development-related prospects has 
been well articulated and documented in the economic literature (see Levine, 1997, 2005; 
Wachtel, 2001; Odhiambo, 2009; Pasali, 2013; Asongu, 2015 and Tchamyou and Asongu 2017 
for detailed expositions). The mechanics as well as the channels through which the beneficial 
impacts of finance on growth are transmitted have crafted a new and emerging strand of 
literature on the one hand, and have continued to be subjected to further empirical scrutiny on the 
other hand. To date, the issue has and continue to witness torrents of empirical assessments 
culminating into unending controversies2.  Nonetheless, the empirical regularity between 
causality running from finance and growth appears to predominate. Undeniably, the pathways 
towards achieving the positive impact of finance on growth are multidimensional in nature3. 
More recently, an emerging pathway has been likened to the concept of financial inclusion (FI). 
It is thus conceived as the process that ensures the ease of access, availability, and usage of the 
formal financial system for all members of an economy. Thus, on a positive note, it has been 
considered as an effective tool that helps reduce poverty, lowers income inequality and promote 
economic growth (See Burgess and Pande, 2005; Levine, 2005; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020; Asongu 
and Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu and Odhiambo, 2019). It has further been conceived as having 
important implications for monetary and financial stability and that it aids in smoothing 
consumption and investment behaviour (Claessens, 2006; Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015; Smith, 
Scott and Shepherd, 2015). By and large, the accumulating body of evidence supports policy 
makers’ assessments that developing inclusive financial systems is an important component for 
economic and social progress in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda (UNCTAD, 
Policy Brief, 2015; Ezazul, 2015). The crucial question remains: to what extent can we hold on 
to these claims? 
Foregoing aside, the performance of most countries in Africa in general and sub-Saharan African 
in particular (with respect to inclusive financing) still leaves so much to be desired. This is 
typified by the low number of bank branches and automated teller machines (ATMs) (Beck, 
                                                             
2 Four different positions can be distilled thus far from various outcomes on the finance-growth nexus namely: 
financial-led growth hypothesis (supply leading Hypothesis); growth-led finance hypothesis (demand following 
hypothesis); demand and supply hypothesis (mutually causal) and mutually independent hypothesis.  
3Among the pathways include issues of (efficiency, reliability, convenience, ease of getting access to funds, and 
technology and innovation) of financial development. 
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Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007; Asongu & Asongu, 2018)4, and also by very low 
figures of financial inclusion. According to FinMark (2009), most of the population in African 
countries rely on informal finance or is financially excluded (e.g. 88 percent of the population in 
Mozambique and 41 percent in Botswana in 2009). Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2011) further 
submitted that bank penetration is lower than 10 percent in some regions of Africa. The foregone 
stylized accounts are suggestive of some missing links; of whichisan institutional infrastructure 
gap. Arguably though, both theory and empirics have lent credence to the useful role of 
institutions in the financial intermediation. For instance, on the one hand, the theoretical analysis 
of economic growth and development has increasingly focused on the role of institutions. As 
Chang (2011) notes, “from the late 1990s ….institutions have moved to the centre stage in the 
debate on economic development” (Chang 2011 p. 473) and “getting institutions right” (Rodrik 
2008a p. 100) has increasingly been emphasized in policy. Financial sector development policies 
have themselves been centrally influenced by this institutional focus with particular emphasis on 
the effectiveness of legal and regulatory frameworks as well as the wider institutional 
environments needed for financial sector development to support economic growth (Goodwin-
Groen, 2012). The empirics on the other hand, also indicate that the positive growth impact from 
financial intermediation does not hold in economies with weak institutional frameworks 
(Demetriades and Law 2006), such as poor or non-existent financial regulation, or in extremely 
high-inflation environments (Rousseau and Wachtel 2002). Much of the evidence suggests that 
the main drivers of financial market depth are the policy and institutional environments in which 
these markets operate.  Thus, achieving deep and efficient financial markets will likely be 
difficult in the absence of corresponding policies that promote economic stability and stimulate 
investor confidence. In this light, the present study seeks to examine if institutional infrastructure 
intermediates in FI-economic growth relations for a panel of countries within the sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) region. 
The study’s contributions are therefore erected on the following standpoints: First, since the 
region is known to be plagued by institutional problems, the nexus between FI and economic 
growth is examined within the context of three broad governance dimensions. These are 
institutional, economic and political components. Second, for robustness purposes, the study 
                                                             
4 The average number of bank branches in sub-Saharan Africa was less than 700 in 2007, and the average number of 
ATMs was less than 1000. 
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employs five alternative measures of financial inclusion namely: Automatic Tellers’ Machine 
(ATMs) per 1000 km2, Automatic Tellers’ Machine (ATMs) per 100,000 adults, Automatic 
Tellers’ Machine (ATMs) per 100,000 bank branches, mobile per households and subscription 
per households. Third, due to endogeneity issues and omitted variables’ biases, a Dynamic 
System of Generalized Method of Moments is adopted. 
As a foretaste and relying on dataset for 20 countries, the following results were obtained: (i) all 
the proxies of FI were found to be positive and significant determinants of growth; (ii) the three 
aggregated indices of governance confirm the strand of the literature which has conceived 
institutions as a propeller and enhancer of economic growth; and (iii) curiously, the interaction 
between proxies for institutions and FI constitute a growth drag to the region. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: some stylise facts about FI and macroeconomic 
indicators are presented in the second section, while a brief exposition on empirical reviews are 
chronicled in the third section. In section four, model specification, data and methodological 
related issues are discussed. In section five, result interpretations were discussed, while section 
six wraps up the study with concluding remarks, and policy recommendations 
 
2.0 Financial Inclusion and Macroeconomic Environment: Some Stylized Facts 
The section dwells on various measures of financial inclusion alongside the wider 
macroeconomic environment for a panel of countries in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region. 
More importantly, the institutional environment under which all these activities are conducted is 
also portrayed.    
Table 1 below, presents the banking sector outreach particularly Automatic Teller Machines 
(ATM) per 1,000km2which are shown to vary across the countries. Interestingly, Namibia stands 
tall among her peers in the ranking with 519.71 and is distantly seconded by Mauritius with 
171.36 ATMs per square kilometres, while the countries which circumstance unavoidably 
destined to be at the bottom include Chad, the Central Africa Republic, Ethiopia and the Congo 
Democratic Republic with 0.01, 0.01, 0.04 and 0.07, respectively. 
For another measure like the number of ATMs per 100,000 adults, is found to be lowest for 
Ethiopia, Burundi and Chad while countries such as South Africa, Mauritius and Cape Verde are 
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at the top of the ratings. A different picture however emerges through the adoption of bank 
accounts per 1000 adults for SSA countries. Of the countries under investigation, Cape Verde 
takes a lead with over 1000 bank accounts per a thousand adults while Swaziland and Botswana 
competing favourably for second and third positions in the precincts of 436.87 and 395.88 bank 
accounts, in that order. Apart from these front-runners, countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho and Namibia also have also maintained over 200 bank accounts for the seven-
year average. However, the least with respect to this measure are for countries like Chad, 
Burundi and Zambia in that order.  In terms of bank branches per 100,000 adults, topmost on the 
list are Cape Verde and Mauritius with 23.16 and 19.09 and with Botswana South Africa, 
Swaziland, Nigeria and Namibia maintaining over 5 bank branches per 100,000 adults. The least 
positions appear to be destined for countries like the Central Africa Republic, Chad and Comoros 
with less than one bank branch per 100,000 adults. 
Apart from the banking sector outreach indicators, information and communication technology 
(ICT) has equally been acknowledged as vital means of promoting financial inclusion in the 
financial development literature. The promotion of ICT has been largely informed by the fact 
that Africa in general has remained challenged by a financial infrastructural gap (see 
Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2011). This is underscored by the very low numbers of bank branches 
and automated teller machines (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez, 2007) and also by very low 
figures of financial inclusion. In specific terms, statistics have it that while the average number 
of bank branches in SSA was less 700 in 2007, on the one hand, that of the average number of 
ATMs was less a thousand on the other hand (see Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2011). . 
Thus, looking at the mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people, the averaged value between 
2004 and 2010 is highest for South Africa with 79.89 and this is directly followed by Gabon with 
74.38 having some marginal advantages over Mauritius with 72.70. It is interesting to note 
however that except for Burundi and Ethiopia with single digit figures of 2.62 and 6.16, all other 
countries in the region have double digit figures. Unlike the mobile cellular, the outlook of 
telephone lines per 100 people is generally poor as can be observed in the table. What this simply 
suggests is that the telephone far outlives its usefulness as ICT is currently witnessing some 
important transitions from telephone to mobile. Despite the relative paradigm shifts in ICT, 
Mauritius remains a forerunner in this respect with a value equalling to 29.93 with Cape Verde, 
South Africa, Botswana and Namibia having 14.88, 9.86, 7.12 and 6.79 in that order. Apart from 
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countries like Cameroun, Comoros, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe with 
negligible single digit values, the remaining countries on queue fall below the line of one.  





































Angola 0.46 5.99 n/a 4.92 26.88 0.85 0.06 
Botswana 0.53 23.52 395.88 7.50 64.95 7.12 0.28 
Burundi 0.27 0.14 17.29 1.74 6.16 0.36 0.00 
Cameroun 0.23 0.83 44.90 1.23 24.97 1.27 0.01 




0.01 0.36 32.92 0.50 10.21 0.15 0.00 
Chad 0.01 0.18 10.81 0.46 10.79 0.30 0.00 
Comoros 2.38 1.09 57.29 0.89 10.93 3.54 0.01 
Congo 
Democratic 
0.07 1.05 38.70 1.32 11.41 0.04 0.00 
Ethiopia 0.04 0.08 82.19 1.09 2.62 0.95 0.00 
Gabon 0.25 6.64 119.88 4.17 74.38 2.39 0.15 
Ghana 2.46 3.83 231.14 4.17 37.82 1.31 0.08 
Kenya 1.84 4.73 254.85 3.55 31.71 1.14 0.02 
Lesotho 2.00 4.66 244.76 2.31 25.54 2.23 0.01 
Liberia 0.31 1.38 n/a 2.02 17.64 0.08 0.00 
Madagascar 0.18 1.00 25.57 1.34 16.17 0.66 0.01 
Mauritius 171.36 36.08 n/a 19.09 72.70 29.93 3.11 
Mozambique 0.56 3.58 n/a 2.40 15.77 0.35 0.03 
Namibia 519.71 27.70 243.76 7.18 45.71 6.79 0.07 
Nigeria 6.00 6.24 377.85 5.19 30.62 0.91 0.03 
Rwanda 1.13 0.47 101.33 2.43 11.75 0.26 0.02 
Sierra Leone 0.18 0.39 101.58 1.91 21.97 0.51 0.00 
South Africa 10.55 38.08 n/a 7.55 79.89 9.86 0.74 
Swaziland 6.02 16.71 436.87 6.38 35.81 4.02 0.05 
Tanzania 0.51 1.89 n/a 1.51 23.47 0.38 0.00 
Togo 1.91 n/a 112.46 2.65 21.37 1.67 0.02 
Uganda 1.79 2.23 129.43 1.64 17.49 0.52 0.01 
Zambia 0.32 3.57 22.00 3.43 21.76 0.79 0.04 
Zimbabwe 1.34 6.87 302.55 3.73 18.22 2.72 0.14 




Lastly, the fixed broadband subscribers per 100 people leave so much to be desired. Going by the 
inclusive financing records, Mauritius still remains topmost on the list of countries in the region 
with 3.11 fixed broad band subscribers per 100 people while Cape Verde lies at the bottom chart 
with 1.21. Generally, all other countries apart from the two previously mentioned countries are in 
a bad shape with respect to fixed broadband subscriptions. 
 
The storyline will assume perfection and plausibly meet a logical conclusion with the 
appreciation of the macroeconomic environment within which each country in the region 
operates. A critical exploit around macroeconomic environment reveals an illuminating picture 
of each of macro-indicator performances. In Table 2, looking at the measure of economic 
performance, we observe the highest per capita RGDP goes to Gabon with the seven year 
averaged value of $6232.5 while countries like Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa with over 
$5000 directly followed in that order. The lists of countries that are fared poorly include 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia and Madagascar with per capita RGDP of $148.1, 189.2, 195.5 and 
282.5, respectively. In terms of credit extension to the private sector in the region, the first 
position is credited to South Africa with over 150 of ratio of credit to private sector to GDP 
while the second position is closely maintained by Mauritius with 78.6 at least over the coverage 
period. The worst positions are claimed by Chad, the Central Africa Republic, Congo 
Democratic, Gabon and Sierra Leone with single digit figures. In terms of macroeconomic 
stability, Zimbabwe is the most unstable at the macroeconomic level in the region with a well 
over 250% rate of inflation. The least rate of inflation goes to both Gabon with 2.3 while 
Cameroun and Cape Verde maintaining a tie with 2.6 each. In terms of the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP, Lesotho average value is the highest (36.8) while the lowest is attracted to 
Zambia with 2.8. Cape Verde ranks highest with respect to gross capital formation as a ratio of 
GDP while Zimbabwe and Nigeria operate at the lowest bottom of the ladder with 8.4 and 9.7, 
respectively. It is noteworthy also that the average of labour participation rate is claimed by 
Tanzania with slightly over 90%, whereas the average of Nigeria stands at 55.2 % for the seven 
year period. Finally, the degree of openness seems to have favoured Lesotho with a slightly over 

































Angola 2185.5 12.0 19.0 18.0 13.2 70.8 121.0 
Botswana 5844.6 23.6 8.8 19.2 31.9 78.2 89.5 
Burundi 148.1 25.7 10.6 25.2 22.7 83.3 44.9 
Cameroun 921.9 10.6 2.6 10.5 18.3 70.3 43.3 




349.5 7.2 3.2 9.0 10.5 78.8 34.3 
Chad 493.4 3.1 2.8 5.7 25.2 71.9 86.6 
Comoros 623.1 11.9 3.5 14.6 13.6 57.2 58.1 
Congo 
Democratic 
1753.3 3.5 4.6 8.8 14.2 72.5 66.6 
Ethiopia 189.2 20.7 15.2 13.8 30.7 86.0 45.6 
Gabon 6232.5 9.6 2.3 5.0 25.1 61.1 91.3 
Ghana 543.9 14.4 13.7 11.9 24.0 70.1 77.9 
Kenya 547.1 28.5 12.2 15.6 19.1 66.2 56.5 
Lesotho 773.0 10.3 6.3 36.8 25.4 68.2 170.1 
Liberia 195.5 10.2 9.9 13.4 21.5 61.6 127.6 
Madagascar 282.5 10.6 11.5 9.5 27.7 89.0 76.7 
Mauritius 5536.7 78.6 6.1 13.8 24.7 63.4 119.3 
Mozambique 338.5 16.8 9.6 14.8 17.0 85.3 72.8 
Namibia 3835.5 48.5 6.0 22.0 23.6 63.7 101.6 
Nigeria 867.0 23.1 11.9 9.1 9.7 55.2 56.8 
Rwanda 306.0 11.0 9.6 15.3 19.6 86.7 38.0 
Sierra Leone 340.8 5.2 13.1 10.0 13.1 67.9 44.0 
South Africa 5539.3 151.6 5.6 19.8 19.8 57.0 60.4 
Swaziland 2400.1 21.8 6.6 14.4 12.8 57.7 148.9 
Tanzania 405.3 13.5 7.5 17.5 28.0 90.7 58.4 
Togo 386.7 18.9 3.5 10.4 16.6 81.6 93.7 
Uganda 350.7 11.4 7.8 12.3 22.0 79.0 47.6 
Zambia 670.4 10.8 12.9 2.8 29.9 80.0 62.9 
Zimbabwe 412.7 16.9 292.2 10.2 8.4 87.4 84.9 






Table3: Seven-Year Average (2004-2013) Of Governance Index  

















Angola -1.18 -0.59 -1.18 -1.12 -1.36 -1.31 -1.12 
Botswana 0.52 0.97 0.56 0.53 0.63 0.97 0.69 
Burundi -0.83 -1.61 -1.16 -1.21 -1.18 -1.03 -1.17 
Cameroun -1.05 -0.42 -0.83 -0.78 -1.13 -1.01 -0.87 
Cape verde 0.78 0.89 0.03 -0.16 0.45 0.63 0.44 
Central Africa 
Republic 
-1.07 -1.75 -1.46 -1.22 -1.45 -1.03 -1.33 
Chad -1.37 -1.68 -1.42 -1.07 -1.48 -1.35 -1.39 
Comoros -0.45 -0.60 -1.71 -1.49 -1.05 -0.75 -1.01 
Congo 
Democratic 
-1.45 -2.18 -1.65 -1.46 -1.61 -1.37 -1.62 
Ethiopia -1.22 -1.62 -0.55 -0.94 -0.73 -0.69 -0.96 
Gabon -0.90 0.26 -0.81 -0.51 -0.58 -0.86 -0.57 
Ghana 0.37 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 
Kenya -0.23 -1.25 -0.57 -0.19 -0.95 -0.94 -0.69 
Lesotho -0.08 0.07 -0.33 -0.64 -0.24 0.00 -0.21 
Liberia -0.39 -1.16 -1.32 -1.37 -1.18 -0.70 -1.02 
Madagascar -0.35 -0.28 -0.60 -0.33 -0.48 -0.12 -0.36 
Mauritius 0.85 0.81 0.72 0.64 0.94 0.50 0.74 
Mozambique -0.07 0.31 -0.53 -0.49 -0.59 -0.51 -0.31 
Namibia 0.40 0.85 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.27 0.31 
Nigeria -0.78 -1.92 -1.02 -0.87 -1.19 -1.04 -1.14 
Rwanda -1.25 -0.59 -0.33 -0.55 -0.61 -0.09 -0.57 
Sierra Leone -0.30 -0.27 -1.20 -0.97 -1.04 -0.94 -0.79 
South Africa 0.61 -0.02 0.53 0.55 0.10 0.30 0.35 
Swaziland -1.28 -0.10 -0.83 -0.61 -0.70 2.11 -0.24 
Tanzania -0.22 -0.29 -0.45 -0.43 -0.39 -0.46 -0.37 
Togo -1.15 -0.47 -1.49 -0.86 -0.95 -0.95 -0.98 
Uganda -0.51 -1.11 -0.50 -0.16 -0.44 -0.82 -0.59 
Zambia -0.29 0.34 -0.80 -0.54 -0.53 -0.62 -0.41 
Zimbabwe -1.55 -1.14 -1.33 -2.09 -1.78 -1.31 -1.54 
Source: Authors’ computation with underlying data from World Development Indicators (2015) 
Generally speaking, virtually all the selected African countries are performing defectively in 
terms of governance indicators. This simply suggests that African institutional infrastructures are 
in deplorable conditions. On a dimension-by-dimension basis, Mauritius takes a lead in voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law with 0.85, 0.72, 
0.64 and 0.94 respectively. While Zimbabwe lags behind specifically with respect to governance 
dimensions like voice and accountability, regulatory quality and rule of law. Toeing the same 
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line of backwardness, are countries line the Congo Democratic Republic and Nigeria whose 
dimensions of governance totally submerged in negative values ranging from -1.65, -1.37 and -
1.92 in government effectiveness, control of corruption and political stability. 
 
4.0 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
This study used a sample of twenty (20) sub-Saharan Africa countries5 over the period spanning 
2004 to 2013to investigate the role of institutional infrastructure in financial inclusion-economic 
growth relations. The countries selection as well as the coverage period is largely influenced by 
data availability consideration. In accordance with theory and previous studies like Beck et al. 
(2007), Honohan (2008), Sarma (2008), Ghosh (2011), Sarma and Pais (2011), and Inoue and 
Hamori (2013), financial inclusion (FI) has been conceived as all initiatives that make formal 
financial services available, accessible and affordable to all segments of the population. Hence, 
the paper utilizes three accessible measures for capturing financial inclusion. They are namely: 
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults6; Bank Branches per 100,000 adults7 and 
ATMs per 1000km8. The usage of this measure is largely influenced by the data availability 
considerations. The corollary lies in the submission of Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) that 
data on the level of service provision is more easily obtained than usage and quality data. In 
Africa, many countries are now at the level of collecting mostly access and some usage data. 
Apart from these measures, the study also employs information and communication technology 
measures namely: Mobile Cellular Subscription per 100 people as well as Telephone Lines per 
100 people. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita which indicates the average income per person in a country. 
                                                             
5The selected countries are: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroun, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia. 
6 Captures demographic penetration; this measure proxies physical outreach dimension 
7Same as ATM per capita. 
8 Captures geographic penetration; this measure proxies physical outreach dimension. 
12 
 
Further, on institution data, the World Bank definition of institution developed by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) comprises six indices9, which are: Voice and Accountability (VA), 
Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption (CC), Government 
Effectiveness (GE) and Political Stability (PS). Each of these indices ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with both extremes representing the worst and best institutional quality in that order. The six 
aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of 
governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. More 
inventively, the study further decomposes institutional variables into three major contexts10. 
First, we investigate how political governance (comprises of voice and accountability and 
political stability) affects FI-growth relations; that is, the process by which those in authority are 
selected and replaced could influence financial inclusion-growth relations. Second, we 
investigate how FI-growth nexus is modulated by economic governance (made up of regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness). Hence, this second dimension is concerned with how FI-
growth relations are influenced by the capacity of governments to formulate and implement 
policies, as well as deliver public services. Third, the study also examines how institutional 
governance (consisting of the rule of law and corruption control) influences the effect of FI on 
economic prosperity. Institutional governance within this context is defined as the respect of 
citizens and state for institutions that govern interactions among them. The decomposition is 
considered crucial on two main counts: first, it will enable a particular governance dimension to 
be pin pointed rather than committing a fallacy of generalization. Second, it will assist in 
formulating a specific policy intervention rather than embarking and taking a general policy 
stance. 
                                                             
9 Each is conceptualized by Kaufmann et al., (2010) as follows: Control of Corruption(CC) captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Political Stability and Absence of Violence(PS) 
measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness(GE) 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory Quality(RQ) captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. Rule of Law(RL) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Voice and Accountability (VA) captures perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
10 A cue is taken from Ajide and Raheem (2016). 
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The adopted control variables that also drive growth are inflation rate measured by growth rate 
of consumer price index indicating macroeconomic performance, government consumption, 
investment, labour force participation and trade openness. The sources of our data are from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), World Governance Indicators (WGI) and 
World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset (Cihak, 2012b). The details of our variables are 
presented in Appendix 1. The summary statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table 4 
and 5. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
ATMs per 1000 Km2 11.186 38.549 0.0032 196.552 
ATMs per 100,000 Adults 9.0886 13.180 0.0194 58.9933 
Bank Branches per 100,000 Adults 4.2507 4.5261 0.3582 22.2358 
Mobile Cellular Subscription per 100 people 40.822 36.419 0.2100 164.217 
Telephone Lines per 100 people 3.3534 6.5551 0.0061 31.5034 
GDP per capita ($) 2408.7 2853.5 205.07 10359.5 
Inflation 8.3404 6.5979 -8.9747 44.3913 
Government Consumption 15.712 6.8997 4.1574 39.6450 
Investment 21.721 7.0411 5.4590 40.3178 
Labour Force Participation Rates 70.482 12.555 47.763 89.6400 
Trade Openness 75.803 34.014 31.049 186.152 
Regulatory quality -5.4364 0.6113 -1.6837 0.9906 
Government effectiveness -0.6412 0.6631 -1.7755 0.9817 
Economic governance -0.5924 0.6256 -1.6609 0.9862 
Voice and accountability -0.5706 0.6863 -1.6971 0.9287 
Political stability -0.5700 0.9133 -2.5239 1.1040 
Political Governance -0.5703 0.7279 -2.0425 0.9367 
Rule of law -0.6393 0.6523 -1.7154 1.0292 
Control of corruption -0.5820 0.6580 -1.5252 1.1599 
Institutional Governance -0.6107 0.6381 -1.5848 0.8999 
Overall Average Governance -0.5911 0.6290 -1.7185 0.8505 
Note: S.D. is standard deviation 
From the table, the different measures of financial inclusion used are: ATMs per 1000 kilometre 
squares, ATMs per 100,000 adults, bank branches per 100,000 adults, mobile cellular 
subscription per 100 people and telephone lines per 100 people. Thus, for ATMs per 1000km2, it 
has the mean value of 11.19 with the maximum and minimum values of 196.55(for Mauritius in 
2010) and 0.003 (for Chad from 2004 through 2007). The ATMs per 100,000 adults averaged 
9.089 with a maximum value being 58.99 credited to South Africa in 2013 and a minimum value 
of 0.019 goes to Ethiopia in 2005. In terms of bank branches per 100,000 adults, the average 
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value stands at 4.251 while the Mauritius and Chad claimed the maximum and minimum values 
of 22.236 and 0.358 in 2013 and 2007. Gabon and Ethiopia obtained the extreme values of 
164.217 and 0.21 in 2013 and 2004 with respect to mobile cellular subscription per 100 people, 
while Mauritius and the Democratic Republic Congo seat on top of 31.50 (being maximum) and 
0.006 (being minimum) in 2010 and 2007. The variations of the financial inclusion measures are 
high as the standard deviation values are greater than their respective mean values. Of the 
measures, the dispersion from the mean for ATMs per 1000 Km2 seemed to be the highest.  
Also, the average value of per capita GDP is $2,408.7 with maximum and minimum values 
standing at $10,359.5 and $205.07 for both Gabon and Burundi in 2010 and 2005, respectively. 
Aside this, it is important to mention that the average values of the three governance components 
are almost standing at par with one another albeit they all carry negative values. It is also 
instructive to state that Mauritius has the maximum of 0.9862 and 0.9367 in both economic and 
political governance components in 2012 and 2013 correspondingly while the least goes to 
Democratic Republic Congo in 2010 and 2004 with -1.6609 and -2.0425 respectively. Also, 
Mauritius and Democratic Republic Congo have 0.8505 and -1.7185 in 2012 and 2004 being the 
highest and lowest value in terms of distribution. The Democratic Republic Congo still has the 
least institutional governance with -1.5848 while Botswana (0.8999) has the highest. Given the 
negative mean values, it would not amount to overstatement that the distribution remains a 
pointer attesting to the poor and worsening conditions of institutional infrastructures in the sub-
region. Furthermore, the inflation which measures macroeconomic instability averaged a single-
digitrate of 8.3404 for all the sampled SSA countries but with extreme rates of -8.97 (Chad in 
2007) and 44.39 (Ethiopia in 2008) standing far wide apart. 
The correlation coefficients were presented in order to reveal if there will be chances of having 
the problems of multicollinearity and over-parameterization in the study. There is high level of 
association between our governance indicators, likewise financial inclusion which indicates that 
they have to be substituted in our empirical analysis with different model specification. The 
financial inclusion variables are further bundle into two composite series using the principal 
component analysis (PCA) in order to avert issues of conceptual conflation and multicollinearity. 
Accordingly, using the PCA serves twin purposes.(a) It avoids the problems of potential 
multicollinearity which often emanates when including more than one proxy in a given 
equation.(b) It allows much information to be extracted in all the indicators. The financial 
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inclusion series have positive relationship with both institution and growth. It implies that 
institutions have an important role to play in ensuring every individual/group benefits from all 
forms of financial services to achieve sustainable growth. This is just preliminary analysis that 
requires confirmation in section four as we include other factor determinants of growth. The net 
effects are also reported in the section.  
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 Financial Inclusion 
Income Control Variables 
Institutional Quality 
Physical Access ICT Access Economic Gov. Political Gov. Institutional Gov. 
ATM1 ATM2 ATM3 ICT1 ICT2 PCGDP INF GOVCON CAP LP OPEN RQ GE EGOV VA PS PGOV RL CC IGOV 
ATM1 1 
                   ATM2 0.585 1 
                  ATM3 0.840 0.827 1 
                 ICT1 0.338 0.736 0.661 1 
                ICT2 0.935 0.749 0.883 0.464 1 
               PCGDP 0.443 0.752 0.727 0.774 0.608 1 
              INF -0.106 -0.150 -0.108 -0.240 -0.161 -0.227 1 
             GOVCON -0.055 0.162 0.074 0.111 0.033 0.054 -0.016 1 
            CAP 0.024 0.038 0.038 0.237 0.055 0.081 -0.051 0.176 1 
           LP -0.271 -0.513 -0.455 -0.458 -0.377 -0.620 0.249 -0.049 0.369 1 
          OPEN 0.268 0.281 0.353 0.254 0.325 0.338 -0.085 0.509 0.098 -0.369 1 
         RQ 0.511 0.725 0.686 0.587 0.645 0.592 -0.130 0.118 0.308 -0.106 0.166 1 
        GE 0.517 0.706 0.673 0.506 0.653 0.536 -0.047 0.245 0.342 -0.030 0.182 0.928 1 
       EGOV 0.524 0.729 0.692 0.555 0.661 0.573 -0.089 0.188 0.332 -0.068 0.178 0.980 0.983 1 
      VA 0.498 0.655 0.579 0.459 0.642 0.443 -0.124 0.338 0.178 -0.154 0.231 0.770 0.735 0.766 1 
     PS 0.364 0.531 0.538 0.522 0.518 0.591 -0.262 0.348 0.256 -0.150 0.472 0.671 0.673 0.684 0.650 1 
    PGOV 0.463 0.642 0.610 0.544 0.628 0.580 -0.223 0.378 0.245 -0.166 0.405 0.784 0.769 0.791 0.879 0.934 1 
   RL 0.573 0.699 0.694 0.544 0.721 0.578 -0.132 0.287 0.383 -0.092 0.291 0.891 0.924 0.925 0.813 0.781 0.873 1 
  CCP 0.367 0.591 0.526 0.428 0.551 0.434 -0.120 0.366 0.339 -0.031 0.319 0.782 0.852 0.833 0.683 0.741 0.787 0.897 1 
 IGOV 0.482 0.662 0.626 0.499 0.653 0.519 -0.130 0.336 0.371 -0.063 0.313 0.859 0.911 0.902 0.768 0.782 0.852 0.974 0.974 1 
OGOV 0.515 0.713 0.676 0.563 0.682 0.589 -0.159 0.322 0.330 -0.108 0.321 0.918 0.931 0.942 0.853 0.851 0.936 0.973 0.909 0.966 
Note: ATM1– automated teller machine per 1,000 km2; ATM2– automated teller machine per 100,000 Adult; ATM3– bank branches per 100,000 Adults; ICT– 
mobile cellular subscription per 100 people; ICT2– telephone lines per 100 people; PCGDP- per capita income; GOVCON- government consumption; CAP- 
capital; LP- labour force participation; OPEN- trade openness; RQ- regulatory governance; GE- government effectiveness; EGOV- economic governance; VA- 
voice and accountability; PS- political stability; PGOV- political governance; RL- rule of law; CC- control of corruption; IGOV- institutional governance; 




4.2 Construction of Financial Inclusion Indices using Principal Component Analysis 
The principal component analysis (PCA) is used to construct composite financial inclusion 
indices tagged FINC1 and FINC2. The former comprises of ATMs per 1000km2 (ATM1), ATMs 
per 100,000 adults (ATM2) and Bank Branches per 100,000 adults (ATM3) while the latter 
embodies both mobile cellular subscription per 100 people (ICT1) and telephone lines per 100 
people respectively (ICT2) (Table 4). This method is used to reduce high correlated series into 
small units of uncorrelated identified as “Principal Components” while retaining the original 
information in the datasets. It has the potentials of avoiding high correlation among the different 
measures of financial inclusion. According to Sricharoen and Buchenrieder (2005: p.2), “PCA is 
an indicator reduction procedure to analyze observed variables that would result in a relatively 
small number of interpretable components (group of variables), which account for most of the 
variance in a set of observed variables”. 








Value ATM1 ATM2 ATM3 ICT1 ICT2 
1st PC (FINC1) 0.5589 -0.6962 0.4505 - - 0.8358 0.8358 2.5075 
2nd PC 0.5551 0.7177 0.4205 - - 0.1383 0.9741 0.4149 
3rd PC 0.6161 -0.0150 -0.7875 - - 0.0259 1.0000 0.0776 
1st PC (FINC2) - - - 0.7071 0.7071 0.7318 0.7318 1.4636 
2nd PC - - - 0.7071 -0.7071 0.2682 1.0000 0.5364 
Note: PC– Principal component; ATM1– automated teller machine per 1,000 km2; ATM2– automated teller 
machine per 100,000 Adult; ATM3– bank branches per 100,000 Adults; ICT– mobile cellular subscription per 100 
people; ICT2– telephone lines per 100 people. FINC1 (physical access measure of financial inclusion)– First PC of 
ATM1, ATM2 & ATM3. FINC2 (ICT measure of financial inclusion)– First PC of ICT1 & ICT2. 
 
The eigenvalues are calculated for each component using the criterion of Kaiser (1974) and 
Jolliffe (2002) to retain common factors. The size of an eigenvalue is greater than one, which 
indicates that the amount of variance in the principal component explained by each component 
should be retained. The results are reported in Table 6. The first index created from the first three 
principal components of physical access to banking services explains about 83.6% of the total 
variance in the original data with an eigenvalue of 2.5075. The second index created from the 
first two measures of information and communication technology (ICT) explains about 73.2% 
(eignevalue of 1.4636) of the total variance in the data. 
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4.3 Model Specification and Estimation Strategy 
Following Barro (1991), we specify the relationship between financial inclusion and economic 
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This is a dynamic panel data model, with temporal and individual dimensions and a lagged 
variable. The variable tiy , is the logarithm of real GDP per capita, FINC  is a wide range of 
financial inclusion variables (including both physical access to banking services and information 
and communication services), tiX , is a set of growth determinants other than lagged per capita 
GDP, h ,,, 210 are parameters, i is an unobserved country-specific effect, ti , is the error 
term, and i and t  represent country and time period respectively. The following set of growth 
determining variables is considered: inflation, government consumption, investment, labour 
force participation rate and degree of openness. To test whether institutions is one of the 
channels through which financial inclusion impact on growth, the initial model specified in 
Equation (1) is retained and an institutional variable is added to the growth equation. The 
institutional variable is captured via three governance dimensions namely economic, political 
and institution governances. If the coefficient weakens, it can then be concluded that part of the 
beneficial impact of financial inclusion on growth is routed through institutions. We include 
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where, INST is governance quality measures (economic, political and institutional governance); 
FINC×GOV is the interaction between financial inclusion and governance measures; 
h ,,,,, 43210 are parameters; i is an unobserved country-specific effect, ti , is the error 
term, and i and t  represent country and time period respectively. 
However, the covariates may not be strictly exogenous. By implication, they can be 
predetermined or endogenous. They are said to be predetermined when correlated with past 
observation-specific disturbances, while being endogenous when correlated with both past and 
current observation-specific disturbances. These problems can be circumvented using System 
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GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Henceforth, referred to as BB 
estimator. This study employs Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator because it performs better 
than Arellano and Bond’s estimator when the autoregressive coefficient is relatively high, the 
number of periods is small. It has the ability to control for heteroskedasticity compared to the 
one-step which accounts for homokedasticity. More so, the approach is also good for addressing 
a dependent variable that is highly persistence. For instance, the level of association of per capita 
income and its lag of one is 0.9988 (correlation coefficient) which exceeds the threshold value of 
0.800. Likewise, the number of countries is higher than the number of periods [T(10) <N(20)] 
which also validate the suitability of the approach. We re-specify our empirical model in the 







































The parameters are h ,, 410  ; tau ( )is the coefficient of autoregression that captures past 
information ; i denotes the country-specific effect; t represents the time specific constant; and 
the stochastic term is represented by ti , . The level equation is used to derive the difference 
equation. We take tau as one since the past exogenous information can be captured by one 
period. In addition, the validity of the internal instruments used must be checked to ensure 
correctness of the results. The use of System GMM must be cautiously checked and thus requires 
several checks before estimation results can be relied upon. This is considered important 
especially when T is small and the number of internally determined instruments is high. It has 
been argued that too many instruments can overfit instrumented variables-failing to remove their 
endogenous components and biasing the coefficient estimates (Roodman, 2009). 
5.0 Empirical Results 
This section presents and discusses the empirical results of the study. Tables 7 and 8 present the 
findings associated to the links between financial inclusion, institutional quality and economic 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The results presented in Table 7 show the extent to which the 
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relationship between physical access to ATMs and output growth has been strengthened 
respectively by economic governance, political governance, institutional governance and 
universal governance. The findings established that: (a) the effect of physical access to ATMs 
measures of financial inclusion is positive on economic growth only with the exception of the 
first and last growth model specifications controlling for economic governance and universal 
governance. (b) The interactions between physical access to ATMs and governance (economic, 
political, institutional and overall) exact negative marginal impact on output growth in SSA 
countries. (c) Most of the control variables have expected signs except for government 
consumption and labour force participation rate that constituted drags on economic growth. The 
dampen effect of government consumption appears to be significant while that of labour force is 
not pronounced. The marginal and indirect effect of government consumption is consistent with 
the findings of Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2011) for African countries which disclosed the 
reflection of homogeneous nature of the African society. A surrogate of capital investment 
enhances SSA growth potentials as indicated by the level of significance. Similarly, the 
coefficients of trade openness are positive and significant, whereas the parameter estimates of 
inflation (measuring macroeconomic stability) are insignificant. (e) The estimated coefficient 
corresponding to lagged dependent variable indicates that its dynamics are stationary and 
converging because the values ranges between zero and one. It implies that countries with lower 
level of real per capita income are emerging and converging with countries with higher real 











Table 7: Financial Inclusion (Physical Access Measures), Governance Dimensions and 
Economic Growth in SSA: Panel System GMM Estimates 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Income 























   
FINC1 ×EGOV -0.0068 
(0.0034)** 
   
PGOV  0.00325 
(0.0094) 
  
FINC1 ×PGOV  -0.0077 
(0.0038)** 
  
IGOV   0.0151 
(0. 0123) 
 
FINC1*IGOV   -0.0093 
(0. 0047)** 
 
OGOV    0.01743 
(0.01046)* 


















































Fisher 4484.63*** 3276.56*** 4369.05*** 3159.98*** 
AR(-1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
AR(-2) (0.214) (0.232) (0.279) (0.223) 
Sargan OIR (0.814) (0.632) (0.679) (0.723) 
Hansen OIR (0.108) (0.191) (0.186) (0.112) 
Instruments 13 13 13 13 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Obs. 180 180 180 180 
Note:Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses;*, ** & *** indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level respectively.FINC1-Financial Inclusion (FI) Index 1 generated through Principal Component 
Analysis (PC) comprising ATMs per 1000km2, ATMs per 100,000 Adults and Bank Branches per 100,000 Adults; 
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PCGDP is Gross Domestic Product per capita; EGOV (Economic Governance): average of Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
and Government Effectiveness (GE); PGOV (Political Governance): average of Voice and Accountability (VA) and 
Political Stability (PS); IGOV (Institutional Governance): average of Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption 
(CC); OGOV(overall governance index): average of RQ, GE, VA, PS, RL & CC; FINC×EGOV is interaction 
between physical access to FI and economic governance; FINC1×PGOV is interaction between physical access 
measure of FI and political governance; FINC1×IGOV is interaction between physical access measure of FI and 
institutional governance; FINC1×OGOV is interaction between physical access measure of FI and overall 
governance index. INF is the rate of inflation; GOVCON is the government consumption; CAP is capital 
investment; LF is labour force participation rate and OPEN is trade openness.OIR is Over-Identifying Restrictions 
Test. The significance of bold values is in three ways: (a) The probability values of the estimated coefficients and 
the Fisher. (b) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (i) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
(ii) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
From Table 8, the following findings established were: (a) with the exception of first and last 
columns, the positive effects of ICT measures of financial inclusion are consistent but were 
insignificant at the conventional level. On the unexpected significance level of the indicator, it is 
important to note that the larger proportion of the population living in SSA is mostly in the rural 
areas with limited or no access to ICT. Moreover, even those with the limited access still find it 
very difficult to use financial transactions such payments, transfers, and other related activities. 
One of the reasons might be because the number of people with access to telephone lines in the 
region is low as the average value indicates 3.35 per 100 people. Although, the mean value of its 
counterpart (mobile cellular subscription per 100 people, 40.82) is reasonable for the region, 
however, majority of these people constrained themselves from using ICT gadgets for financial 
transaction purposes because of the increasing cyber frauds and other cyber-related crimes. (b) 
The coefficients of governance are positive and significant but their interaction with ICT 
measures of financial inclusion have negative marginal estimates with the exception of 
controlling for political governance. The indirect effects imply decreasing returns to growth from 
ICT measure of financial inclusion in the midst of weak institutional settings in the region. (c) 
The findings pertaining to the control variables are consistent with what we have established in 
Table 7. (e) The assertion of convergence still holds as the estimated lagged dependent variable 
consistently ranges from 0 to 1.  
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Table 8: Financial Inclusion (ICT Measures), Governance Dimensions and Economic Growth in 
SSA:Panel System GMM Estimates 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Income 























   
FINC2 ×EGOV -0.00301 
(0.00177)* 
   
PGOV  0.0077 
(0.0044)* 
  
FINC2 ×PGOV  0.0047 
(0.0028)* 
  
IGOV   0.0197 
(0. 0101)** 
 
FINC2*IGOV   -0.0038 
(0. 0019)** 
 
OGOV    0.0233 
(0.0118)** 


















































Fisher 4402.19*** 2111.21*** 2369.34*** 2472.07*** 
AR(-1) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
AR(-2) (0.262) (0.217) (0.238) (0.270) 
Sargan OIR (0.762) (0.617) (0.638) (0.670) 
Hansen OIR (0.150) (0.128) (0.127) (0.149) 
Instruments 13 13 13 13 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Obs. 180 180 180 180 
Note:Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses;*, ** & *** indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level respectively.FINC2-Financial Inclusion (FI) Index 2 generated through PC comprising of 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions per 100 people and Telephone lines per 100 people;PCGDP is Gross Domestic 
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Product per capita; EGOV (Economic Governance): average of Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Government 
Effectiveness (GE); PGOV (Political Governance): average of Voice and Accountability (VA) and Political Stability 
(PS); IGOV (Institutional Governance): average of Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption (CC); 
OGOV(overall governance index): average of RQ, GE, VA, PS, RL & CC; FINC×EGOV is interaction between 
physical access to FI and economic governance; FINC2×PGOV is interaction between ICT measure of FI and 
political governance; FINC2×IGOV is interaction between ICT measure of FI and institutional governance; 
FINC2×OGOV is interaction between ICT measure of FI and overall governance index. INF is the rate of inflation; 
GOVCON is the government consumption; CAP is capital investment; LF is labour force participation rate and 
OPEN is trade openness.OIR is Over-Identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is in three ways: 
(a) The probability values of the estimated coefficients and the Fisher. (b) The failure to reject the null hypotheses 
of: (i) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; (ii) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
The post estimation tests conducted are the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation and 
Sargan test, which is helpful for examining over-identification restrictions. The results of the 
autocorrelation test show that in most cases, there is no autocorrelation in the model. The results 
of the Sargan tests show that the instruments are not correlated with the error term; hence, they 
are exogenous as a group. In addition to these tests, we equally conducted the Fisher tests for the 
joint significance of the series in the model. The results posit that the estimated models, in most 
cases, are jointly significant. 
For robustness purposes, the study went further to split our sample size into two regimes: the low 
regime (where each indicator is lower than its median values) and the high regime (where each 
indicator is equal to or greater than its median value). The result of this exercise is presented in 
Table 9. It could be summarily stated that the higher the institutional quality of a country, the 




Table 9: Sample Splitting Regression Results for the Six Governance Indicators 
Variables 
Political Governance Component Economic  Governance Component Institutional Governance Component 



























































































































































































































0.91 0.71 0.84 0.73 0.93 0.60 0.90 0.72 0.90 0.75 0.66 0.87 
Hansen Test (0.741) (0.636) (0.525) (0.563) (0.787) (0.861) (0.780) (0.821) (0.901) (0.783) (0.899) (0.657) 
AR(2) Test (0.435) (0.378) (0.662) (0.712) (0.554) (0.616) (0.911) (0.276) (0.624) (0.376) (0.256) (0.411) 
Note:Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses;*, ** & *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ), Government Effectiveness (GE), Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability (PS), Rule of Law (RL),and Control of Corruption 
(CC); FINC1-Financial Inclusion (FI) Index 1 generated through Principal Component Analysis (PC) comprising ATMs per 1000km2, ATMs per 100,000 Adults 
and Bank Branches per 100,000 Adults;FINC2-Financial Inclusion (FI) Index 2 generated through PC comprising of Mobile Cellular Subscriptions per 100 
people and Telephone lines per 100 people;PCGDP is Gross Domestic Product per capita; INF is the rate of inflation; GOVCON is the government consumption; 
CAP is capital investment; LF is labour force participation rate and OPEN is trade openness.The significance of bold values is in three ways: (a) The probability 
values of the estimated coefficients. (b) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (i) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; (ii) the validity of the 




6.0 Concluding Discussion and Directions for Future Studies 
The study uncovers the causal relationship between financial inclusion and economic growth 
via the intermediating role of institutional infrastructure for a panel of twenty sub-Saharan 
African countries between 2004 and 2013. Owing to the limitations that characterized the use 
of pooled OLS, fixed and random effect models, we employ the System Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM), to investigate the impact of financial inclusion with good institutional 
settings for sustainable growth in SSA. The empirical findings are based on two financial 
inclusion indicators (access to ATMs and ICT measures) and four governance variables 
(economic, political, institutional and general). The five insightful outcomes emanate from 
the study, and they are: (a)on average, the unrestricted positive impact of physical access to 
ATMs and ICT measures of financial inclusion on SSA growth is established but the former 
is found to be significant at 0.05 critical value; (b) the both unbundled and bundled 
institutional variables viz: economic, political, institutional and general governances are 
established to be growth-spurring; (c) the effects on output growth associated with the 
interaction of financial inclusion and governance are positive for physical access measures 
but mostly otherwise for ICT measures; (d) countries with low levels of real per capita 
income are matching up with other countries with high levels of real income per capita; and 
(e) other factors that significantly influence output growth are capital investment, openness to 
trade and government consumption. 
The findings are consistent with past studies like Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2011), Lundqvist 
and Erlandsson (2014) who have investigated the importance of financial inclusiveness of the 
poor through ICT penetration to the overall growth in sub-Saharan African countries. We 
further established that physical access to ATMs as a means of making financial services 
easy, cost-effective and inclusive to the less privileged, contributes to SSA’s growth. The 
study reveals that the relevance of financial inclusion to growth was enhanced by the 
prevailing institutional framework in the region. The empirical evidence of some insignificant 
marginal impacts are indications that imperfections in the financial markets are sometimes 
employed to the disadvantage of the poor. Some of the reasons were noted by FinMark 
(2009) that many Africans rely on informal financing because they were not financially 
included. On the whole, we established positive effects on growth for the most part. The 
positive effects are evident because the governance indicators compliment financial inclusion 
in reducing pecuniary constraints hindering credit access and allocation to the poor that 
deteriorate growth. This is consistent with Goodwin-Groen (2012) in the viewpoint that 
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financial sector policies have been influenced by quality institutional settings to support 
economic growth. The findings equally show that countries with low income are moving-up 
with other SSA countries with high level of income. Hence, supporting income convergence 
theory. These are in accordance with previous studies (like Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; 
Baumol, 1986; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Fung, 2009; 
Narayan, Mishra and Narayan, 2011; Bruno, De Bonis, and Silvestrini, 2012; among others) 
that have documented same within the framework of neoclassical growth models. 
In light of these emanating outcomes, a few policy prescriptions are advanced. First, efforts 
should be intensified towards promoting inclusive financing. This can possibly be achieved 
by easing access to banking services, which can be availed through electronic banking 
services and via other internet-related services. Second, well thought-out institutional reforms 
should be strengthened via different governance dimensions earlier identified. More 
specifically, economic and institutional governance structures should be further enhanced as 
their magnitudes of impacts are more visibly pronounced. The growth recipes (that is 
financial inclusion and institutional infrastructure) should be independently pursued as 
synergy between the duo may help in discounting growth-enhancing potentials inherent in 
such region like SSA. 
Beyond this, future efforts should be geared towards unveiling other means of capturing 
financial inclusion and institutional infrastructure as there is no general agreement as to the 
correctness of the measures used since they have come under severe criticisms. There is room 
for future studies to extend empirical literature by focusing on country-specific trends on how 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Signs Variable Measurement Data Sources 
Physical access measure of 
financial inclusion 
ATM1 ATMs per 1000 Km2 World Bank’s Financial Structure 
Dataset 
ATM2 ATMs per 100,000 Adults World Bank’s Financial Structure 
Dataset 
ATM3 Commercial Bank Branches per 
100,000 Adults 
World Bank’s Financial Structure 
Dataset 
ICT measure of financial 
inclusion 
ICT1 Mobile Cellular Subscription per 100 
people 
World Development Indicators 
ICT2 Telephone Lines per 100 people World Development Indicators 
Economic growth PCGDP GDP per capita ($) (log) World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate INF Inflation (growth rate of consumer 
price index) 
World Development Indicators 
Government consumption GOVCON General government final consumption 
(% of GDP) 
World Development Indicators 
Investment CAP Gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) 
World Development Indicators 
Labour force participation LP Labour Force Participation Rates, total 
(% of ages 15 and above) 
World Development Indicators 
Trade openness OPEN Total trade (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Economic governance EGOV 
Economic Governance Computed 
Regulatory Quality World Governance Indicators 
Government Effectiveness World Governance Indicators 
Political governance PGOV 
Political Governance Computed 
Voice and Accountability World Governance Indicators 
Political Stability World Governance Indicators 
Institutional governance IGOV 
Institutional Governance Computed 
Rule of Law World Governance Indicators 
Control of Corruption World Governance Indicators 
 
